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TECHNOLOGY and ORGANIZATION: Strategic
Intersections and Asymptotes
Christopher J Davis, PhD
College of Business, University of South Florida St Petersburg, USA

ABSTRACT
Although it is commonly assumed or hoped that information systems can be aligned or
matched with organizational needs, notions of match, alignment and fit are poorly defined.
Nor is the hoped for alignment apparently happening. We argue that it is not in general
possible to state an organizational need and then proceed to match it with a suitable
technical arrangement. We see needs and technology as co-emergent, and mediated through
possibilities. Needs do influence technological development, but those developments, from
the very beginning; open up new possibilities, which in turn begin to be re-articulated as
needs. Further, technological developments are not purely needs driven, but may open up
new organizational horizons, and so begin to generate needs autonomously. We illustrate
our argument with a case study of the introduction of new biometric technology into a police
department
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INTRODUCTION
The idea that computer-based information systems ought somehow to 'fit' their organizational
context, or match organizational needs, meets with general accord as evidently desirable. In
evolutionary models of information systems growth in organizations, such as Nolan's (Nolan
1979), a 'mature' stage of evolution is envisaged in which IT/IS strategy becomes aligned
with or integrated into corporate strategy, and IS developments and investments become
prioritized in accordance with their relevance to key business objectives. This desirable
endpoint seems however never to be reached, nor is there any indication of it coming nearer.
Is this because of some temporary turbulence in the technology or in organizational
economies? Is it rather a deeper problem, caused by the restless and intertwining dynamisms
of technological change and organizational change, which will always prevent any final
alignment, but nevertheless allow approximations to it? Or is there a mistake in the notion
that organization and technology can be matched or fitted together in the first place?
We incline in this paper most closely to the latter view, on the grounds that the idea of what
would constitute a match never stands still, but itself evolves as organizations move into new
areas of activity and new uses of technology. This is not to declare that attempts to establish
requirements, needs, or priorities before embarking on a project of technological change are
futile; such attempts are generally essential to provide structure to a programme of work and
grounds for commitment of resources. But it is to say that the matching of information
systems to organizational needs can never be achieved in any final sense, not principally
because needs are always plural, contentious and shifting - though they are - but more
fundamentally because the impacts of technological change can never be fully appreciated
except through use of the new systems, and out of that very use new avenues of possibility
will open and new desires emerge.
This paper is divided into two main sections. The first provides some conceptual analysis of
ideas of match or fit between information systems and their organizational contexts. It starts
from a useful analysis and review by Iivari, and picks up from him the call for an approach to
the subject that is more processual than structural.
Scarbrough and Corbett's model of the technology process and Friedman's model of computer
systems evolution are then used together to lay the groundwork for an argument that
organizational and technological change are complex, continuous, interacting processes,
occurring at all levels and in all areas of organizations. They cannot be effectively driven
from one point, and therefore any match that can be achieved between an information system
and its organizational context will be partial and temporary (but may still be worthwhile).
The ideas developed in this analysis will then be applied in the second section to a case study,
where we discuss the implementation of a system for fingerprint identification (AFIS Automated Fingerprint Identification System) in the fingerprint unit of a police department.
The 'organizational need' in this case is at first glance straightforward and unremarkable - to
continue fingerprint identification work, if possible with gains in efficiency and hit rate; but
the new technology turns out to open up organizational possibilities. Our analysis shows how
its impact was more revolutionary than consolidating, highlighting the danger of assuming
the existence of a point in time when organizational needs and information systems will align
or fit.
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TECHNOLOGY, NEEDS, AND POSSIBILITIES
In his analysis of the concept of the organizational fit of information systems, Iivari points
out that it has been used in IS research in an imprecise, 'pre-theoretical' manner (Iivari 1992).
He sees the notion of fit as fundamental to contingency theories of information systems, and
uses it as a general structural concept, to be distinguished from notions of user-system fit
prevalent in the area of human-computer interaction and drawn from a psychological tradition
(as used for instance by (Mumford 1995, p35) in her treatment of job satisfaction 'fits' in the
ETHICS methodology). Iivari regards the high-level concept of fit as still viable, despite a
meta-theoretical attack on contingency theory in general and the concept of fit in particular
from Weill and Olson.
Iivari identifies three main interpretations of the concept of fit in contingency theory, a
selection approach (which has been dominant), an interaction approach, and a systems
approach. In the first of these, the fit of information systems to organizational context is
deemed to be achieved by selection - either managerial or natural selection. Interaction
approaches interpret fit as being achieved when specific IS are judged to support specific
organizational activities sufficiently well to meet stated performance or conformance criteria.
A systems interpretation sees fit in terms of the degree of consistency obtained between the
set of IS on the one side and multiple prevailing contingencies on the other. He wants to see
some unification of the research traditions behind these approaches, and more development
of the interaction and (especially) systems approaches. He also wants to build links between
three areas of research - research into information systems as such, into IS impacts, and into
IS adoption - emphasizing the need for longitudinal studies and for empirical investigation of
actual impacts and adoption processes. Iivari's move towards research into process (rather
than structure) is interesting, although it may jeopardize the primacy of the notion of fit if it
becomes a goal for a process (since the goal may shift as the process unfolds).
Scarbrough and Corbett offer a processual model of technological innovation in
organizations, which treads a middle way between technological determinism and managerial
determinism (Scarbrough and Corbett 1992). They propose a cyclical/reciprocal model of the
technology process (see p 9), in which the three phases of the technology process - invention,
exchange, and use - influence one another reciprocally (i.e., invention can be triggered from
exchange, and exchange from use). One round of innovation sets off the next (use stimulates
further invention). Social and technical structures, skills and knowledge, all flow (and are all
fluid) within the cycle. Scarbrough and Corbett go on to argue that organizations can also be
beneficially seen as processes rather than structures, and further that, in an organization,
organizing and technological processes shape and reflect one another.
The Scarbrough and Corbett model provides a base for understanding change and innovation
in an organization as a complex, continuous, plural, and multi-level process: invention can
occur anywhere, and can be procedural as well as technical; social forms will emerge in the
course of the development and use of some new artefact, method, or system; and new
knowledge, skill, and expertise will accumulate in the areas of innovation. Invention will not
spring out of a vacuum, but emerge out of consideration of possibilities in particular contexts,
where these contexts have themselves been shaped by previous inventions, developments,
and uses.
Scarbrough and Corbett acknowledge (pp 101-102) that technological change is often more
acceptable to a workforce than changes in work organization or working practices. The
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reasons are complex, but have to do with the perception of technological change as
progressive, concrete, familiar, and representing confidence in the future, contrasted with a
view of organizational change as destabilizing. Despite its increasingly pervasive impact on
organizational and social life, information technology is apparently regarded as
unthreatening, still 'just a tool'. The implication of this point for the present argument is that
whereas debate about organizational change is liable to be conservative, cautious and perhaps
closed, technological change will be more readily accepted and introduced. Far from
producing any matching of information systems to organizational need, this will tend to
produce a current of technological change always running ahead of the articulation of needs.
Friedman's model of computer systems development (Friedman and Cornford 1989) is also
processual, and at once more general and more specific than Scarbrough and Corbett's. It is
more specific in concentrating particularly on computer/information systems evolution, and
more general in being pitched at the level of whole sectors of economies rather than at the
level of organizations. Friedman tries to unify three different strands of explanation of
computer systems growth - organizational stages approaches (like Nolan's), technological
explanations (hardware/software generations), and labour process approaches (tracing the
evolution of forms of work with computers). His key unifying motif is that of constraint: the
evolution of computer systems is driven forward by the mobilization of resources to
overcome constraining factors which presently limit further development of computer
systems. He shows a general progression through successive phases in which first hardware
constraints, then software constraints, and subsequently user relations and interorganizational
constraints come to the forefront as primary problem areas. Resources and effort are
concentrated on solving or ameliorating the immediate difficulties, and once some progress
has been made, this problem area begins to subside and a new one, formerly less urgent,
comes to the fore.
Friedman's account adds linear momentum to the cyclical model of Scarbrough and Corbett
(creating a helical or spiralling movement overall), and shows more precisely how
technological progress, work organization, and management action, while remaining partly
autonomous one from another, interweave to address pressing problems and open up new
possibilities. The same general forces and initiatives are at work in all organizations, and
produce similar and communicable results (accelerating the overall change process), but
never identical ones.
These processual analyses can be used to explode the entrenched but by now outmoded
pyramidal model of organizations, which sees management as layered into strategic, tactical,
and operational levels, and significant decisions and innovations as always issuing from the
strategic apex and cascading down. This model is inadequate, and can explain neither the
richness nor the potential of organizations. It is mistaken in assuming an upward gradient of
complexity from base to apex and in using that both to justify status and power differentials
and to expect comprehensive and coherent strategy formulation at the top. In reality,
complexity and the skill and expertise needed to deal with it are found at every level.
Strategy is needed everywhere. If strategy formulation is the preserve of the organizational
apex, and denied or unrecognized elsewhere, the organization will most likely have no
strategy, since that which passes for it, issued from the top as edict or mission, will be
untranslatable at operational levels.
The Scarbrough and Corbett and Friedman models allow us to see that any hope of an
effective strategy for technological change in organizations will only come from sharing of
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knowledge (and of power) across levels and areas in an organization (and across
organizational boundaries). Since this sharing can never be complete or final, every strategy
will be provisional. For the same reasons, any matching of information systems to their
organizational context can only ever be partial and temporary (but is still worth striving for):
the dreamed-of perfect match is indefinitely postponed.
To work at all, 'matching' must be a continuous constructive process, conducted plurally,
rather than seen as the achievement of what Scarbrough and Corbett (1992) call closure or the
arrival at a fixed point in time (Paul 1994). This means participative development at the
application level, at the departmental level, and at the organization-wide level (for both
internal and external integration). All developments need multi-level involvement, to spread
knowledge and retain coherence. Development projects must be extended in both directions
to encompass the phases of invention and use. There will never be enough time or energy to
accomplish this completely. It can nevertheless be effective and successful within its limits which may make all the difference between organizational success and failure.

CASE STUDY
This research was initiated by an invitation from a Chief of Detectives to study the emerging
impacts on work practice and expertise of the introduction of a new information system to
assist fingerprint identification: the need for a study into impacts was thus perceived within
the police department itself. The software is AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Identification
System). The AFIS specification was prepared centrally by the government and put out to
tender. The contract included not only delivery of the software but establishment and
operation of a national fingerprint database and identification system. The specification was
very tight on delivery times and fingerprint matching capabilities. The software was supplied
a company specializing in a range of engineering application areas.
The case follows the chronological sequence of events and is preceded by a brief explanation
of the evolution of fingerprint work to date in order to provide a context for the case analysis
and discussion that follow in later sections.

FINGERPRINT WORK
The need for and purpose of fingerprint identification work are scarcely questioned. Other
biometric identification techniques, especially DNA matching, are increasingly important, but
the absence of a substantial national database currently limits its ability to identify an
unknown offender. Fingerprint identification work has been around for a long time (see
Cherrill 1954), its methods and practices have matured, and its effectiveness is universally
recognized. It is securely underpinned by anatomical theory, and identifications made by
fingerprint technicians are almost never challenged in the courts. There is no significant new
organizational need visible here, only a need to continue the work, maintain standards, and if
possible improve efficiency and identification rates.
The basic task in fingerprint identification work is to identify a fingerprint obtained at a crime
scene (a latent 'mark') as belonging to a particular individual, on the basis of a comparison
with prints obtained from that individual (usually a set of ten - a 'tenprint'). Since a person's
fingerprints are unique and persist throughout life, if a mark can be matched to a person's
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fingerprints that will provide conclusive evidence that that person left that mark. The method
of matching is precise, and to become expert at it requires long training. Fingerprint
technicians acquire expert status when they reach a level of performance in which they make
no false identifications and miss no or very few true identifications. The basic method
involves visual matching of two fingerprints, using the naked eye, a magnifying glass, a
magnifying screen called a comparator, or a computer display screen. The expert looks for
specific characteristics in the skin ridges on the fingertips, particularly for ridge endings and
for ridge bifurcations. A number of patterns commonly recur in fingerprints, such as loops,
arches, whorls, and pockets, and these usually feature a central area (a 'core') and a peripheral
area, where ridges diverge to flow round the pattern (a 'delta'). Experts use these patterns,
and cores and deltas, in initial orientation and classification of prints, prior to detailed
comparison. To establish a match between two fingerprints, the expert needs to find the same
characteristics occurring in both prints, in the same sequence and spacing (i.e., same number
of intervening ridges between one characteristic and the next). According to the current
standards operating in this country, finding a matching sequence of characteristics in two
prints is sufficient to judge them identical.
This is painstaking work, but fairly straightforward if we already have two prints we want to
compare. If we have a mark but no suspect, how can we begin to look for a match among the
thousands of sets of prints we may have filed in the local region, or the millions in the
national fingerprint collection? Two chief methods have been used in the past to narrow
down the searching process: one has been to keep 'bundles' of prints belonging to criminals
active locally, and search them first; the other has been to classify prints on the basis of the
primary pattern (loop, whorl, etc), store the fingerprint collection in classification order, and
restrict a search on a mark to those prints falling in the same class. A comprehensive
classification scheme called the Henry System was used for a century. Until the mid 1990s
the Henry scheme was used to search a local mark against the national fingerprint collection.
However, coding prints using the Henry classification is a time-consuming business, and fell
into disuse in the mid-1990s, at which time local fingerprint collections were rearranged from
Henry classification order into alphabetic order, thus becoming unsuitable for 'cold' searches
(i.e., where no suspect is known).
This produced a problem, since the likelihood of an identification being made on a mark
where there is no suspect, unless it could be matched in one of the 'bundles', was remote.
This was the main difficulty that produced a need for an information system to support cold
searching of marks against a tenprint collection. Some computer systems in use before the
introduction of AFIS such as AFR (Automatic Fingerprint Recognition) systems were of
some use in this regard, but required restriction of the search at the outset, and produced an
unranked set of candidate matches, so requiring considerable subsequent comparison work
which often did not produce an identification.
Many such AFR systems had been abandoned before the introduction of AFIS technologies,
not principally because of their poor performance but because reallocation of district
boundaries and codes made necessary to re-engineer them so substantially that was not worth
undertaking when a new technology (AFIS) was known to be about to be available for
piloting. AFIS thus appeared on the horizon at a timely moment: it was not so much that
AFIS was the answer to a precise new organizational need, but that AFIS became available
and looked promising at the moment when another system, which had been meeting the need
for cold searching - though not very well - became possible to abandon for organizational
reasons.
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AFIS
AFIS consists of a central system; fingerprint unit front-end systems; an integrated
communications system connecting the central system to the unit systems; training systems;
and a test and development system. AFIS utilizes a secure national network to carry data
between the central site and the police departments.
AFIS technologies move towards the government ideal of integrated or ‘joined up’ criminal
justice. Success stories already abound: for instance, “…in January 2000, police stopped a
driver for not wearing a seat belt and took him into custody when they suspected him of
providing false details. A national AFIS search confirmed his true identity within 10 minutes
and further checks revealed that the man had been wanted in connection with a $11million
commercial robbery since 1996”(Leith 2000).
AFIS is one of the biggest image storage systems and hold hundreds of millions of images
and million scenes of crime (latent) marks. Its search speed is one million fingerprint
comparisons per second. AFIS architectures are designed to provide a foundation for future
growth and technology insertion. State of the art AFR technology, improved workflow
capabilities and access to an electronic office environment greatly increases the time that a
fingerprint technician has to view and verify identifications. Modular and scalable central and
unit system designs meet increased workload demand and increases in database sizes.
The impressive technical design and performance has made AFIS a great success, reflecting
credit on those responsible for its procurement and its developers. Since September 2000,
searches of the national fingerprint database have been taking less than 20 minutes on
average, well under the contractual target of 1 hour. Participants in the research agreed that
the success of the design phases of AFIS was largely due to the high level of involvement of
fingerprint technicians. As a result, AFIS has an impressive technical design. The humancomputer interface is particularly popular. The success of the design and pilot phases also led
to AFIS being seen as a self-contained, ready to run system owned by the fingerprint
technicians.
The following sections make some observations about this research in the light of the
conceptual analysis of match or fit between information systems and their organizational
contexts set out in the first part of the paper. The commentary on the early phases of the
research is substantial since it is here that the relationships between technological progress,
work organization and management action were articulated and the exploration of their
interweaving began. Our observations are cumulative and arise partly from reflection on the
research project and partly from reflection on the similarity between the issues raised in this
case and those reported in other organizational settings

PILOT OPERATIONS
A small number of police departments were selected to pilot AFIS. The first step was to
install the AFIS software and hardware locally and undertake 'back record conversion': this
involved scanning in fingerprint images from existing records (previously held both on hard
copy and on an earlier computer system). The next step – the pilot phase proper - linked the
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local system to the national system, enabling the AFIS Mark Case Management (MCM)
capability to access to the full national database. The majority of the police departments did
not pilot AFIS.
During pilot operations, our brief was to gauge the impact of AFIS on working practices and
organization in the fingerprint unit. In terms of Iivari's characterization of research areas, this
was research into IS impacts. It quickly became clear that the study would be more valuable
if it could be extended through the pilot and into the operational period (i.e., became a
longitudinal study). Less obviously, as the political ramifications of the introduction of AFIS
dawned on us or were revealed to us, we found it necessary to extend our investigation
outwards (and upwards) into the broader IS context and into the IS adoption process.
The fingerprint unit we studied comprised a section of some 25 fingerprint technicians and
clerical support staff located in a single large office within the Forensic Investigations
Division at police headquarters. The division also included photographic and chemical
laboratories. Crime Scene Investigators (CSIs) - who visit crime scenes and obtain forensic
evidence, including fingerprints - were not located at HQ, but at bases distributed around the
district.
From the point of view of information systems strategy, the arrival of AFIS was a non-event.
Since it is merely a matter of recomputerizing an existing application, there were no strategic
implications. What is more, the software arrived on its own hardware platform, was
perceived to be well engineered and supported by the system supplier, and came free (the
government funded the pilot schemes). There were no resource implications for the police
department’s IT staff, who had next to no involvement in the installation or initial operation
of AFIS. Strategically, even operationally, AFIS was invisible outside the fingerprint unit at
this time. In terms of the overall IS architecture for the police department, AFIS, however
highly engineered and powerful it might be, looked like a minor piece of end-user computing,
peripheral to its main IT provision.
The back record conversion (BRC) phase of AFIS worked well: the records included in the
local database were well chosen, and an impressive hit rate was rapidly achieved. Because of
the demise of the previous system, AFIS immediately became, for these fingerprint
technicians, the front line search system. Because the AFIS interface is well designed to
support the general flow of fingerprint identification work, the users adapted to it quite easily.
Because the matching algorithm worked well and fast (on the small local database, at least),
and produces a ranked list of candidate matches for a mark, AFIS was welcomed as the kind
of software they had always wanted. A band of enthusiasts formed, who found they could
use the BRC system not only to load on their old tenprint forms, but also to match marks
against them and achieve hits that had escaped them before. The pilot police department
gained a reputation with the system suppliers as leaders in the practical exploitation of AFIS.
Though their success was partly due to their having to ‘jump ship’ to the new system because
their old system had collapsed, they appeared as innovators. Without any serious change to
working practices, the fingerprint unit gained performance improvements and kudos.
From the point of view of the fingerprint technicians, AFIS did not change the way they
work, merely given them the search engine that the previous computer system and the earlier
Henry classification mechanism could not provide. Fingerprint technicians, experts,
managers and software suppliers all insist that identification of a mark is achieved not by the
software (despite its name), but by the expert (fingerprint officer). All the software does is
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search for possible matches and present them for consideration. To make the identification,
the technician or expert follows the same procedure as before, looking for coincident
sequences of characteristics in two fingerprints under comparison. The fact that the experts
are not privy to the details of the AFIS search, matching, or scoring algorithms did not
concern them. The main threat to the fingerprint experts' position is seen by them not to
come from usurpation by the software of their role in identification, but from their own
improved productivity using AFIS, which may lead management to contemplate reductions
in the number of fingerprint experts and technicians required (an example of organizational
change being perceived as more threatening than technological change).
Fingerprint expertise is in fact shifting. The need for mastery of the Henry classification
system is disappearing, even though experts still declare it to be useful background
knowledge. The capacity of AFIS to search across a whole database, the need to search
against specific fingerprint patterns has also reduced, even though the ability to recognize
loops, whorls, and the other patterns is still felt useful for describing and discussing
fingerprints. Skilled AFIS users emerged, able to use image enhancement techniques and
feature selection strategies to encode marks in such a way as to gain maximum benefit from
the AFIS matching algorithm. Skills emerging at this level of detail can only come out of
practice. They cannot have been designed into the software in order to meet declared
organizational needs. They are produced rather by users experimenting with the limitations
and possibilities of the system they are learning to work with.
The next phase of AFIS, after back record conversion, included the extension of mark-toprint searching from the local database to the national database. This full mark case
management (MCM) capacity also included new capabilities described in the system
documentation but that had neither been prepared for nor much discussed. These capabilities
included workflow management and office automation. We anticipated at the time that, if
used, these features would significantly change the organization and flow of work within the
fingerprint teams. They could produce closer association between scenes of crime and
fingerprint work through more integrated processing of marks, and could increase
connections between diagnostic and clerical work. How this would turn out could not be
predicted in advance, but emerged during implementation and use, as we report in the later
sections of this paper.
The implications for work organization seemed on the face of it considerably more farreaching in operational AFIS than they were in the BRC phase. Yet it is impossible to say
where the organizational need driving this information system development came from.
Most of the additional functions came as surprises to local management. The system supplier
did not push them, but merely took the line that it is making them available. Central
government seems to be the most likely source of these 'requirements', and yet they also
appeared to paint them as opportunities or possibilities rather than clear directions. We
realized that, whatever the strategy or intention might have been, pressure for real
organizational change would build with the following phase of AFIS, when the fairly limited
functionality and familiar interface of BRC was replaced by the much more comprehensive
and integrated package for managing information and workflow and connecting the Unit
more closely to crime scene work and into a general national criminal records system.
On the point of the connection to the CSI bases, it is interesting to note that a local PC system
for tracking CSI jobs was initiated after agreement had been reached to take AFIS. This had
only been partially implemented at the time of our initial research: we were told that it would
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not be completed. It was clear that if the mark case management capabilities described in the
AFIS documentation had been understood, the partially implemented system might not have
been developed at all, but perhaps a front end designed for AFIS instead. During the pilot
operations phase, this was not organizationally feasible because no one was publicizing the
additional capabilities of AFIS, and no one in the headquarters criminal investigation division
or in the IT department was in a position to include AFIS in an IT strategy. As it turns out,
with the tracking incomplete and the earlier AFR system abandoned, AFIS is being
introduced into a disconnected IS environment where paper flows and registers were being
used to track data and events.

CASE MANAGEMENT
The AFIS architecture described above required its physical location in the fingerprint units.
This tended to reinforce the perception of fingerprint work as unique and mysterious. It also
reinforced the sense of ownership of AFIS: during pilot operations, the system quickly
became embedded in the crime scene processes. The resounding success of AFIS integration
into crime scene identification, the traditional core activity of fingerprint units, had a
downside: the high level of direct support for the fingerprint community tended to
marginalize other workers, such as crime scene investigators, criminal records clerks, and
detectives, all of whom are involved in the two wider ‘business’ processes that fingerprints
support – verifying the identity of arrested persons (supported by AFIS Ten Print
Management – TPM) and identifying offenders from the (latent) finger marks left at crime
scenes (supported by AFIS Mark Case Management – MCM). During development and pilot
operations, the description of AFIS as ‘just a fingerprint tool’ became a touchstone used by
fingerprint workers to show that they were comfortable with the system and did not feel
threatened by it: unfortunately, in the early stages of implementation, it also reinforced the
myth that the impacts of this powerful new system would be limited to the fingerprint
community.
AFIS was fundamentally different from any AFR system previously developed or used. AFIS
provides a ‘front-end’ to the criminal names database: the sophisticated AFR functionality
and physical location of the hardware in the fingerprint units tended to mask the significance
of this technical integration until the early phases of implementation. Despite the widespread
understanding of crime detection and police work more generally, fingerprint work is still
regarded even by many inside the police as a ‘black art’. The mystery surrounding the
contribution of the fingerprint community to the wider crime detection and identity
verification processes reduced management awareness of the significance of many of the
issues that arose from the use of AFIS as a common medium to support these two distinct
‘business’ processes.
Analysis of this second phase highlighted fewer obstacles and occasions where expectations
diverge than had been experienced during pilot operations. The explanation for this seems to
lie in the emergence of new relationships and networks within the fingerprint unit as AFIS
became assimilated into the management of crime scene (mark) cases. Where expectations of
the participants’ did diverge, it tended to arise from the interpretation of documents such as
the functional specification, updates for police chiefs; memoranda of understanding (MOU)
and guides to operational procedures . Although such guides were working documents,
subject to continuous and collaborative review and updating by fingerprint unit staff, it is
interesting to note that these printed (and therefore ‘fixed’) documents provided the locus for
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discussion of non-alignment of AFIS and local organizational needs as well as the evidence
that contractual obligations had been fulfilled.
In contrast to the ossification surrounding the documents, the pace of change to the process
and organization of fingerprint work increased. The support of AFIS MCM for mark-to-mark
and print-to-mark searching, as well as mark-to-print searching – the primary means of
undertaking crime scene work - highlight the inadequacy of the perception of AFIS as “just a
fingerprint tool”. Analysis of the transition from pilot to full MCM operations shows how
increasing awareness and exploitation of AFIS functionality encouraged the emergence of
new ways of working, for instance through the establishment of links between scenes of
crime even before a suspect had been identified. The possibility of identifying a suspect
responsible for a series of crimes prompted this use of AFIS: the technology enabled
fingerprint evidence to be used pro-actively and speculatively in ways that previously would
not have been possible, or at least realistic in resource terms.
Since crime scene mark processing had historically been a local responsibility and therefore
the primary function of local fingerprint units, the (latent) mark case functions offered by
AFIS were quickly and readily integrated into this established field of expertise. Although the
implications of AFIS for the ten print process were equally well documented as those
affecting the scenes of crime process, our research showed that awareness of them was lower
and their significance was not as quickly appreciated.

PRINT MANAGEMENT
The ten print process was radically changed by the introduction of AFIS. The most
significant change was the devolution of responsibility for ten print verification to local units.
Both the process and responsibility for its management changed.
Responsibility for the ten-print verification process was assumed by the pilot department at
this point in the project: AFIS ten-print management (TPM) devolved responsibility to police
departments. Many of those departments had no experience of this work whatsoever. Unlike
the transition from pilot operations to full national MCM capability, where substantial change
at the AFIS central site gave rise to little if any visible impact in the fingerprint unit at our
pilot site, the transition to ten-print management involved little change centrally: the national
database was still the resource used to support the verification process. However, the changes
locally were substantial as a business process completely new to this organisation was
introduced.
Our research into ten-print devolution (Beeson and Davis 2001; Davis 2002) highlights the
technical integration of AFIS and other information systems – that is to say, the development
of an interface - to support the ten-print verification process as the locus of substantial
unanticipated change. The complexity of the issues and concerns arising from devolution of
ten-print verification work were greater than expected. The main reason for this seems to
arise from less intense involvement of local fingerprint staff. Ten print verification had been
carried out centrally for many years: although aware of the nature of this work, staff at the
study site had no involvement or experience of it.
The AFIS ten-print process succeeded practices that involved sending paper ten print forms
for verification. Time to complete the verification process was measured in weeks. This
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latency was known about and exploited by criminals. They would deliberately give false
details when arrested, for instance using the driver’s license of a friend with no previous
record. When they appeared in court, the apparent absence of any previous record would lead
to a light sentence for the crime. Only long after the court case would the falsification be
realized, requiring the police to trace and re-arrest the offender. As well as being
embarrassing and time consuming for the police, the latency in the verification process had a
significant effect on the integrity of the criminal record database held. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that 30-40% of the records held were false.
AFIS offered dramatic reductions in the time to complete the verification process: combined
with digital finger print image capture technology, verification of an offender’s identity
within one minute became possible. This dramatic improvement in the speed of service
delivery had a number of implications.
Experience elsewhere showed that AFIS provides the potential to change the sequence of
events following arrest so as to exploit the improved process speed. As with other
technological innovations, the criminal community responded more quickly than the criminal
justice community. Police officers found that people brought into custody would say “…I see
you have AFIS: I won’t bother to give you a false name then…” Reduction in the incidence
of false details reduced the need to cross reference aliases in the criminal record database and
provides a means to ‘clean up’ the database.
Also significant is the need for legislative changes in order to exploit the process
improvements provided by these technologies fully. To be most effective, the identity
verification process needs to be initiated as early as possible, ideally on arrival at the police
station or even on the street using a portable input device.
Most immediately significant from a managerial perspective were the implications of the
devolved ten-print process for identity verification tasks carried out by workers outside the
fingerprint unit. Although ten print verification is computationally less demanding than crime
scene work, it is more complex organizationally. Identity verification involves the
reconciliation of fingerprint image data about an arrest held on AFIS with the alphanumeric
criminal record data. National databases are maintained through the efforts of a variety of
departments. This variety adds another dimension to the complexity of change surrounding
AFIS: the achievement of consensus about tasks and data prioritization becomes more
difficult as the community involved with AFIS widens: the goal of alignment or fit becomes
more elusive as new ways of exploiting AFIS are found and the community continues to
expand.

SUMMARY
Our longitudinal study of the impacts of AFIS on the process and organization of fingerprint
work has concentrated on the transition of the system through three important project phases:
pilot operations, mark-case management and ten-print management. As we realized early in
this research and pointed out early in the paper, it is important to remember that the increase
to both software functionality and the range of people and departments affected by it are both
cumulative. It is important, therefore, to consider this case in the broader context of
fingerprint work and the criminal justice system in which that work takes place.
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In what sense was there any matching of an information system to an organizational need
going on here? The picture is not straightforward. If the department hoped for a perfect and
unproblematic match between AFIS and its identification methods and work organization, it
is likely that could only have been achieved by resisting change and denying potential. In the
pilot operations phase, AFIS certainly did not improve the match between central and local IS
at this site, or even between different local IS within police headquarters. A local strategy for
AFIS gradually emerged from practical necessity inside the department and may escalate
within the forensic investigation department.
Matching of information system to local organizational needs will continue to develop within
the fingerprint department now that AFIS is fully operational. It may be a form of matching
which merely underscores existing practices (i.e., additional functionality not used); or the
additional functionality could be imposed by departmental managers, perhaps with adverse
effects on expert commitment; or, as with the pilot phase, operational AFIS could be taken up
creatively and the exploration of its possibilities used to stimulate debate about organizational
evolution.
But there is currently still no strategic direction that includes AFIS visible outside SI.
Because AFIS is so well packaged and supported, there has not been any substantial need for
knowledge of it to grow outside the fingerprint and other departments involved in the tenprint verification process; confronted with ever more pressing priorities, the management
hierarchy perhaps feel AFIS can be safely regarded as a purely local improvement, and
responsibility for its evolution ceded to other agencies (such as any number of government
agencies, the system supplier, or one of the various AFIS user groups). It may on the other
hand be possible to achieve a degree of matching retrospectively. A local steering group
could be established with multi-level membership to try to harmonize AFIS implementation
and development with broader IS objectives. It would not be sensible to try to control the
continued exploitation of AFIS entirely from a level above the forensic investigation
department, since the deepest practical understanding of AFIS resides at the operational level.
A multi-level group might be able to open up a constructive dialogue between experts in
application areas and strategists from different points in the hierarchy.

CONCLUSIONS
We have tried to show in this paper that matching of information systems to organizational
needs is not a simple matter, and is in fact infeasible in any final sense: there is no point in
time at which organizational needs and information systems’ capability will converge. Our
analysis of the development, implementation and use of AFIS at the pilot site shows how
alignment of information systems and organizational needs is repeatedly and indefinitely
postponed.
Information systems, despite the claims of their developers, cannot fully integrate
information provision in any organization. No matter how effective and reliable the technical
integration of information systems, it will never offer a ‘solution’, merely a prompt for
exploration of the increased functionality offered and the emergence of new information
needs. For this reason, matching systems to needs is rather a matter of continuous
achievement occurring in many areas of an organization concurrently. We have used
processual models from Scarbrough and Corbett and Friedman to show the general
complexity and momentum of organizational and technological change, and in particular to
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show new needs always emerging out of the possibilities opened up by the use of existing
systems and practices.
If information systems are to be matched to organizational needs at all, we argue, fuller
consultation and participation across organizational areas and levels needs to be achieved, so
that a plurality of views can be exchanged and multiple competences can be brought into
contact. Strategy needs to become a distributed rather than a hierarchical organizational
process, and development projects of all kinds need to be extended in both directions so that
invention is not left merely to experts and managers and use purely to users. Wherever
discontinuities between strategy and operation and between invention and use can be
repaired, there will be a chance of local and temporary (but still useful) harmonization of
needs and systems.
The force of Iivari's call for linked research into IS contexts, IS impacts, and IS adoption was
brought home to us in reflecting on our own experience of our research so far into the AFIS
implementation. That work has certainly led us from study of impact of one IS into the study
of the broader IS context and of the IS adoption process. These reflections, including the
writing of this paper, will influence the subsequent course of this research.
The AFIS investigation confirms our belief that the connection between an information
system and organizational needs is tenuous and obscure. As Iivari suggests, investigation of
real adoption processes and real responses to situations is more revealing than abstract
analysis. We see in this case a development driven by complex combinations of
circumstance and opportunity. The twists and turns are explicable, but not easily predictable.
The process can be steered to some extent, but only by involvement in it. As suggested by
our theoretical considerations, making the system work in context will be a process of
accommodation of a plurality of interests as well as a convergence of skills and knowledge.
This case shows that the AFIS implementation at the pilot site could not be (and has not
been) designed in advance to match precisely articulated organizational needs, but people can
work together with it to produce what turns out to be a mutually acceptable outcome. Such
continuing participative development will, we anticipate, be manifest in the restructuring of
fingerprint expertise as AFIS and other technologies are learned and adopted.
The case also highlights the dangers that arise from belief that alignment of organizational
needs with information systems functionality can be achieved at some point in time. Many of
the tensions between the fingerprint community and organizational managers observed
during the implementation of AFIS arose due to the assumption that ‘implementation’
represented a point in time at which the technology ‘solution’ would fulfill the organization’s
needs. Clearly, this is a naïve expectation. Our hope is that this case, and others, will alert
organizational managers to the dangers that the mock Fixed Point Theorem highlights and
will see information systems as presenting opportunities for change and innovation that
require their creative and constructive input rather than acceptance as ‘solutions’.
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